China's Passe Party

"Membership Has Its Privileges: The Socioeconomic Characteristics of Communist Party Members in Urban China" by Bruce J. Dickson and Maria Rost Rublee, in Comparative Political Studies (Feb. 2000), Sage Publications, 2455 Teller Road, Thousand Oaks, Calif. 91320.

It’s long been evident that (to paraphrase George Orwell) though all are equal in communist lands, some are more equal than others. But thanks to the economic reforms in post-Mao China, and the consequent need for professionals and technicians, it appears that membership in the Chinese Communist Party is no longer virtually the only path to "more equal" material rewards.

Party membership, to be sure, continues to provide tangible benefits, especially for cadres, note Dickson and Rublee, a political scientist and graduate student, respectively, at George Washington University. In 1988, when party members made up less than five percent of China’s total population, the average urban party member, a survey the following year showed, earned 191 yuan—40 more than the average urban nonmember did. (And that doesn’t count the income from bribery and other corrupt behavior, widespread among party and government officials.)

Yet, revealingly, party members were not concentrated in all of the most prestigious sorts of jobs. Yes, about 84 percent of the officials surveyed and 77 percent of the factory managers belonged to the party (in sharp contrast to the seven percent of laborers who belonged)—but 66 percent of the professionals and technicians did not belong to the party. Moreover, Dickson and Rublee found, for rank-and-file party members (though not the cadres), a college education provided a bigger wage boost than belonging to the party did.

The post-Mao reforms "created new opportunities for pursuing career goals," observe the authors. "Individuals could seek advanced degrees from Chinese or foreign universities" and pursue technical careers, or go into business. Many who took those alternative paths "were reluctant to join the party," because of its restrictions and its demands on members’ time. Despite its diminished appeal, however, party membership remains attractive to aspiring bureaucrats among "China’s best and brightest," Dickson and Rublee note.

After the 1989 survey, which was conducted by a team of American, British, and Chinese scholars, the Chinese Communist Party clamped down on such inquiries. As a result, Dickson and Rublee are able only to surmise about the impact of the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989 and the "explosive growth" of the private sector during the 1990s. In all likelihood, say the authors, the appeal of China’s Communist Party has shrunk even further.