China's Rap Sheet

"China’s Use of Force, 1950–1996, and Taiwan" by Allen S. Whiting, in International Security (Fall 2001), MIT Press Journals, 5 Cambridge Center, 4th Flr., Cambridge, Mass. 02142–1493.

Before September 11, the conflict be-He looked at eight cases in which China tween China and Taiwan stood near the top resorted to military force for deterrence or of U.S. foreign policy concerns. Whiting’s coercion, including the 1950–53 Korean essay suggests it should be there still. War, the conflicts over small Taiwanese islands in the 1950s, the 1962 border war with India, and the 1969 border clashes with the Soviet Union. Whiting, who is a professor emeritus at the University of Arizona, sees five common elements in China’s behavior. Its leaders 1) had an exaggerated perception of the threat to China, 2) were willing to take on a superior enemy, 3) carefully managed risks, 4) gave advanced "deterrence warning" to their foes, and 5) always sought to seize the initiative and be preemptive. By Whiting’s reckoning, Beijing chalked up four clear victories and no serious defeats by using this method.

This historical experience does not augur well for peaceful relations between China and Taiwan, and Whiting’s vision is darkened by several new factors. In the past, for example, China almost always gave early warning of its intent to use force—partly because that gave it the opportunity to amass needed forces. But a conventional attack across the treacherous 100-mile-wide Taiwan Strait is unlikely. China would likely use missiles, and that would give it an incentive to strike suddenly and decisively. The Chinese penchant for seizing the initiative further increases the likelihood of such a strike.

Whiting also worries about the dangers of miscalculation. Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping often underestimated their foes’ response, and unlike them, China’s new generation of leaders "lack any military experience." What they do share with their predecessors is a belief in the primacy of political goals over military considerations, and that could lead to hasty action. Not only has there been growing talk of unification with Taiwan, but "rising instability" in China might make it more tempting for the leadership to launch a unifying war effort. At the same time, Whiting says (writing before September 11), China’s leaders regard the United States as a paper tiger.

Whiting does not go so far as to predict war. He sees several encouraging developments, such as the growing traffic in people and goods between China and Taiwan. But "China’s past pattern in the use of force casts a worrisome shadow over the next decade."