Sizing Up China

"Does China Matter?" by Gerald Segal, in Foreign Affairs (Sept.–Oct. 1999), 58 E. 68th St., New York, N.Y. 10021. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

In the continuing debate over China’s significance for the West today, Segal, director of studies at London’s International Institute for Strategic Studies, weighs in with a dismissive appraisal. "Odd as it may seem, the country that is home to a fifth of humankind is overrated" as an economic market and a military power, he says. "At best, China is a second-rank middle power that has mastered the art of diplomatic theater."

Economically, China is of little importance, particularly outside Asia, Segal maintains. In 1997, it accounted for only 3.5 percent of world gross national product, compared with the United States’ 25.6 percent, and for only three percent of world trade—less than the Netherlands’ share. Even China’s portion of Asian trade is only 11 percent. "Despite the hype about the importance of the China market, exports to China are tiny," he says. Of U.S. exports, less than two percent go to China— about a third less than go to Taiwan. And, at the moment, China’s economy "is effectively in recession," Segal observes. It is doubtful that it has had, or will have anytime soon, a doubledigit rate of growth, despite the limited reforms of the last 20 years and exaggerated claims based on questionable data. He sees all this as part of the overblown view of Asia generally. Fears that the Asian financial crisis would cripple Western economies have proved groundless, but the lesson has yet to be learned about China.

Militarily, China is a "second-rate" power— stronger than most of its Asian neighbors but unable to take on the United States, Segal writes. True, it may pose a threat to the Philippines. "But sell the Philippines a couple of cruise missiles and the much-discussed Chinese threat will be easily erased.... Even Taiwanese defense planners do not believe China can successfully invade."

It does matter that Beijing has nuclear weapons targeted at the United States, Segal notes, and that it steals U.S. nuclear secrets. But China still is, like Iraq, only "a regional threat to Western interests, not a global ideological rival" such as the Soviet Union was. "Such regional threats can be constrained. China, like Iraq, does not matter so much that the United States needs to suspend its normal strategies for dealing with unfriendly powers."

In light of China’s strategic threat, limited though it is, "it is ludicrous to claim, as Western and especially American officials constantly do," Segal says, "that China matters because the West needs it as a strategic partner. The discourse of ‘strategic partnership’ really means that China is an adversary that could become a serious nuisance. Still, many in the Clinton administration and elsewhere do not want to call a spade a spade and admit that China is a strategic foe." Yet to exaggerate the threat is alarmism. "Only when we finally understand how little China matters," he says, "will we be able to craft a sensible policy toward it."